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  John Dilworth
Abstract
Films are usually assumed to be types, with their templates or
performances being tokens of those types. However, I give a
counter-example in which two different films are
simultaneously made by different directors, with the outcome
of this process being a single template length of film which, I
claim, embodies both of those films. But no two types could
thus have a token in common, and hence type views of films
must be incorrect. I further explain and defend the legitimacy
of the example, and conclude by offering an alternative,
representational view of the nature of films that can also more
adequately explain the interpretive nature of experience of a
film.
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Several categories of artworks, such as films, novels, plays or
musical works, are such that works in those categories seem
not to be particulars, but instead to have multiple copies,
instances or performances, so that ontologically speaking such
artworks are naturally regarded as being types, which have
such copies, instances or performances as their tokens.[1] In
addition, there are those, such as Gregory Currie, who argue
that even apparently particular artworks such as individual
paintings are really tokens of some relevant painting type.[2]
However, in some recent papers I have argued that such typetheoretic approaches to the arts are seriously flawed in various
ways.[3] In this article I shall extend those criticisms to apply
more directly to films[4] by presenting a counter-example to
views such as that of Noël Carroll, who has proposed a 'type'
account of the ontology of film according to which films are
types whose tokens include both 'templates' such as a film
print or videotape, and individual film performances or
showings generated from such token templates.[5]
A type view such as that of Carroll might seem to be a natural,
or even unavoidable, basic position on the ontology of film.
However, I shall attempt to show that that it is vulnerable to
the following kind of counter-example. This vulnerability arises
because of a logical feature of types, namely that there could
not be a single token that was simultaneously a token of two
distinct types of the same general kind. For example, if dogs
and cows are two distinct types of animal, then there could not
be a single animal that was both a dog and a cow. And
similarly, if films are types, then there could not be a single
film token, such as an individual template film print, that was
simultaneously a token of two distinct films.
But my counter-example will involve just such a case, in which
two distinct films are associated with a single physical
template, which therefore could not be a token of both distinct
films considered as types. Here is the counter-example, which
as far as I know has not previously been envisaged or
investigated by others.[6]
1. Example
The example concerns the making of two films. Two directors

Leslie and Steve are independently approached by a
scriptwriter Carla, who pitches a different script idea to each.
Leslie's film, to be called Greed, would be about a cold-hearted
financier whose only interest is in money, who ruins the lives of
all around her in her efforts to accumulate more wealth; on the
other hand, Steve's film, to be called Sacrifice, would involve a
story about a woman driven to great financial success by a
desperate need to love and help those about her.
Both Leslie and Steve are sold on the different script-ideas
presented to them by Carla, but there is a potentially crippling
practical difficulty: neither can afford to make his or her film,
since the cost of hiring Carla to write it, plus of hiring actors,
studio technicians, etc. is for both Steve and Leslie almost
twice the amount that each could raise from backers or other
sources to pay for their respective films.
Well, desperate people will resort to desperate remedies. One
of the three of them, it doesn't matter who, comes up with the
following unconventional solution to their dilemma. To start
with, Leslie and Steve will each hire Carla to write their
respective films for them, but to save costs Carla will write the
two scripts with a large amount of overlap between them.
Specifically, all of the characters, situations and dialog will be
identical in each - they will differ only in stage directions and
other materials explaining to the actors each director's
different point of view on the characters etc. Thus Carla has to
very carefully write the two scripts in such a way that each of
the characters, incidents and dialog in them is susceptable to
both of the different interpretations she originally pitched to
Leslie and Steve.
Is this possible? Yes it is, because human actions are subject to
different interpretations. What Leslie sees as selfish, acquisitive
behavior in the leading character (who of course could only be
named 'Jana', for two-faced reasons) could be viewed by Steve
as selfless behavior done with its only object being to benefit
others. Of course, not anything that Carla writes is susceptable
to both interpretations, and as a result of this Steve and Leslie
are often at odds with each other. Hence they suffer through
many awkward and even acrimonious sessions with Carla in an
attempt to arrive at a single line of dialog in the two scripts
which each can accept as embodying their differing overall
conceptions of their respective films.
Once the scripts are finished, the next stage of their
unconventional agreement must be embarked on. To save
costs Steve and Leslie have also agreed that they will use the
same actors, studio technical facilities and shooting schedules
for each of their films, with Carla serving as casting director
and liason with the studio for each of the films.
By now Leslie and Steve are hardly talking to each other, given
their divergent artistic conceptions and the great difficulties
under which they are working, so the burden falls on Carla to
see that everything is brought about in a manner which is
satisfactory to each of them. As casting director for both films
she has to audition actors and explain to them the uniquely
confining working conditions, under which (we recall) each has
to satisfy not just one but two separate film directors, each of
whom has divergent conceptions of what kind of human
character each line of dialog in the two scripts is to reveal and
develop.
After screening out those actors who will not agree to work
under these conditions, or who fail the initial auditions or
screentests, Carla then presents each surviving candidate actor

separately to Steve and Leslie for their respective approval.
Naturally, each will approve an actor only if convinced he or
she gives an effective portrayal of the character in each of their
respective films. Hence many candidates are turned down by
one or both of Leslie and Steve, with the result that they are
rejected altogether. Only when both Steve and Leslie are
independently satisfied with an actor's portrayal of a role in
each's respective film is he or she hired by each director to
play each of their respective roles.
Once casting for each film is completed, the (if possible) even
more awkward combined shooting sessions are embarked
upon. By this stage Carla has to really crack the whip over
Leslie and Steve, to force them to come to agreement on the
specifics of the shooting schedule for each film, the order of
the scenes, technical and interpretive matters of lighting
arrangements and camera angles, and so on.
But even with these prior arrangements finally ironed out, the
actual shooting sessions often turn out to be abortive, since of
course each director has veto power over any session which
does not individually satisfy each of them as properly carrying
out their individual artistic intentions for that shooting session
as part of each's respective film. Hence many retakes of scenes
are often necessary before both directors are satisfied (both on
the film set itself and after viewing the filmed outtakes from
these sessions) with their adequacy for her or his own artistic
purposes.
The final artistic battles between Steve and Leslie take place in
the cutting room. Originally each director had intended to edit
his or her own film from the surviving film stock produced from
those shooting sessions which were jointly acceptable.
However, after initial trials both Leslie and Steve are quickly
convinced that they lack many of the necessary but rare skills
required to convincingly edit each of their films. They realize
that each needs to hire a professional film editor with a proven
artistic track record to complete each of the two films.
However, here as before, financial constraints force them to
economize and hire a single film editor, Jack, to complete both
films. But what is worse, because of his great reputation,
Jack's time is extremely expensive and, so as before, both
directors are forced to use the very same extremely confining
joint-approval techniques in making use of Jack's services.
They are forced to individually work with Jack in a way similar
to that in which each originally worked with Carla in producing
the script: each individual segment or scene edited by Jack for
each of them must be approved by each of Steve and Leslie for
their own separate artistic purposes before it is allowed to
remain in either's final edited film as spliced together for each
by Jack.
A final point: since neither director wants his or her film to be
associated with the name of the other director (since, above
all, they wish to avoid the accusation that they have merely
succeeded in producing a jointly directed single film), they
agree that neither of their names will appear on the screen in
the film credits. And for the same reason they agree that the
titles for their respective films will also be omitted from the onscreen credits. For naturally Leslie does not want the audience
to be informed onscreen that they are watching Steve's film
Sacrifice, for she intends that they should instead be watching
her film Greed; while, as one might expect, Steve has similarly
strong views about potential onscreen confusion for the
audience with respect to his own film.[7]

The outcome of these processes is a single spliced length of
film which embodies[8] two distinct, separate films (Greed and
Sacrifice). Thus ends the example.
To conclude this section, I claim that if this example really does
show what it seems to, then we already have a conclusive
refutation of the view that films are types. Because if Jack's
final, single spliced length of film is indeed a single putative
token both of Steve's film Greed and of Leslie's distinct film
Sacrifice, then those distinct films cannot be types, for the
purely logical reasons already given.
But this conclusion might be resisted in two ways. First, the
genuineness of the example might be questioned, and second,
even if the legitimacy of the example is conceded, it might be
argued that it is a mere logical oddity that has no implications
as to the status of films in general.
A necessary ingredient in an adequate refutation of any such
potential objections is a reasonably clear basic account of the
identity conditions for films, which I shall now provide.
2. The identity of a film
The identity criteria for a film, such as Leslie's film Greed,
involve two main kinds of factors, namely factors relevant to
the identification of the particular finished film template L itself,
and to the identification of the relevant actions and successfully
realized intentions of the director[9] (Leslie) insofar as they
help to explain how or why that finished template has the
features that it actually has.
To see that both kinds of factors are relevant and in what
ways, note first that it is conceivable that there might be a
numerically distinct but qualitatively identical film template, L'',
that had been produced by some completely different causal
process having nothing to do with Leslie's intentions and
actions in directing her film. In such a case, that template L''
would not count as embodying Leslie's film (and nor Steve's
either), because it would not satisfy a 'causal particularity'
criterion that is satisfied by Leslie's template L, namely one
that causally links the length of film in question to Leslie's
actual film-making activities, which thereby caused that
particular length of film L to come into existence.[10] Thus,
being the causal outcome of Leslie's directorial activities is a
necessary condition for the template L to embody Leslie's film
Greed.
At the same time, if we give due consideration to some
relevant possibilities or contingencies associated with filmmaking, it would be too constraining to require that only
template L could have served as the template for Leslie's film.
For example, since L consists of various spliced lengths of film
derived from various shooting sessions, it seems clear enough
that, if in fact the whole film had been shot from a single batch
of film B from a given manufacturer M, then if the studio had
instead received a qualitatively identical but numerically
distinct batch B' of film from M, then Leslie's film template
would not have been L but instead a numerically distinct
(though presumably qualitatively identical) template L', whose
spliced sections came from batch B' rather than batch B of film.
Thus Leslie's film-making activities could have produced a
numerically distinct template L', but since L' would have still
been the causal outcome of Leslie's activities, it would have
still counted as embodying Leslie's film Greed, unlike the firstmentioned template L'', which had no causal connection
whatsoever with Leslie's film-making.

In addition, it would be metaphysically too demanding to
require qualitative identity for any template that could have
been the causal outcome of Leslie's activities. For just as the
particular batch B of film stock might have been different, so
also various other conditions or causal factors in the film
production might have been different. For example, in one
scene a slightly larger sofa might have been used for
characters to sit on, so that the relevant spliced segment of
film from that shooting session would have had minor
qualitative differences from the corresponding actual segment.
Or a scene might have been shot at a different time of day
from the actual time, so that minor qualitative differences in
the lighting of the scene could have occurred.
Nevertheless, there are limits to the amount of possible
variation in the resulting template or templates. Only those
possible templates which would both be the direct causal
outcome of Leslie's film-making actions and intentions, and
which would embody her relevant intentions, would count as
legitimate templates of the film Greed. And of course, exactly
similar points could be made for Steve's film Sacrifice. This
concludes my basic account of the identity of a film.
3. The counter-example is genuine, and general
In brief, I claim that the counter-example is genuine because
the single final film template produced does, according to the
identity criteria for films just given, embody both Leslie's film
Greed and Steve's film Sacrifice. The example carefully
described the (often difficult and acrimonious) process through
which both Leslie and Steve did manage to each carry out his
or her distinct film-making intentions, and how each did so by
producing a single final film template that was the direct causal
outcome of the distinct film-making intentions of each of them.
I shall consider a more specific objection to the genuineness of
the counter-example later, but for the present I shall use the
discussion of identity criteria for films both to further
demonstrate the genuineness of the example and also to show
its generality.
The 'generality' objection to be considered is that even if the
legitimacy of the example is conceded, it might be argued that
it is a mere logical oddity, that has no implications as to the
status of films in general. Presumably the objector's point is
that there is something logically unique or deviant about either
or both of Steve and Leslie's films, so that their non-typehood,
even if it is conceded, shows nothing about ordinary, nonsimultaneously produced films.
In reply, the logical flexibility built into the identity criteria for
films as discussed above can be used to show the normality of
each film, as follows: It was pointed out that there might have
been some differences in the causal chain that produced each
film, without this thereby destroying the identity of either of
them. But most importantly for our purposes, the causal chain
which produced Leslie's film might not have involved Steve's
film-making at all, nor any of the (admittedly somewhat mindboggling) complications resulting from his concurrent attempts
to make his film while Leslie was making hers. It seems
undeniable that Leslie could have made substantially the same
script, casting, scene-shooting and final cutting decisions that
she did, which contributed to her successful realization of her
film-making intentions, even if Steve and any activities of his
had played no causal part whatever in her film-making.
Indeed, not only could Leslie have done this (in some abstract

empirical sense, such as that her doing so would not have been
incompatible with any known physical laws), but we have good
evidence that it is a realistic artistic possibility that she would
have done this, assuming that her general artistic intentions
were the same in each case. For at each and every stage in the
film-making process Leslie freely made the artistic decisions
that she did, even though she could have made different ones
if she had wanted to. As a competent, serious artist, Leslie
would not have allowed her overall artistic purposes to be
deflected or compromised by any of the difficult practical
hurdles or stumbling-blocks which are part of the environment
in which every artist must work--including those unusual
difficulties which arose because of Steve's film-making
activities. Hence there is no reason to think she would have
proceeded diffferently, even if Steve's activities had been
causally absent from her film-making.
To be sure, in the absence of Steve's activities it seems likely
that parts of the causal history of Leslie's film-making would
have been different. For example, presumably the film would
have been made more quickly, in the absence of any
acrimonious debates with Steve, and so various specific
differences both in the numerical and qualitative identity of
spliced segments of the final film template could be expected
to result from the more condensed time-frame. But as I have
argued in my account of the identity criteria for films, those
criteria are flexible enough to allow for such counterfactual
numerical and qualitative variations.
The upshot of this discussion is that Leslie's film is indeed both
a normal film and a film independent from that of Steve
because it is a realistic possibility that Leslie could have, and
would have, made the same film, Greed, with the same overall
artistic intentions, even if Steve and his activities had played
no causal part in her film-making.
And of course a similar line of argument to the above, as
applied to Steve's film Sacrifice, would also establish its
normality, and artistic independence or distinctness, from
Leslie's film Greed. Hence I conclude that the counter-example
is both genuine, and generalizable to apply to any films.
4. Qualitative differences
However, so far no mention has been made of what, intuitively
speaking, is the strongest argument for the distinctness of the
two films, Greed and Sacrifice, namely that the intentions of
the two directors, as realized in their films, are qualitatively
different in significant respects.[11] For recall that Leslie's film,
Greed, is about a cold-hearted financier whose only interest is
in money, while on the other hand, Steve's film, Sacrifice,
involves a story about a woman driven to great financial
success by a desperate need to love and help those about her.
Furthermore, one of these films could be much better or more
artistically successful than the other, which would serve to
emphasize their artistic distinctness. Indeed, it would be
surprising if some divergence in success did not occur, given
the unique artistic limitations under which each director was
working.
Also, it is not inconceivable that the lead actor in each film
might, in the case of one of the films, win an Oscar for her
brilliant, convincing portrayal of the main character's singleminded egotism, whereas in the other film she might generally
be condemmed for her shallow, unconvincing portrayal of a
woman desperately trying to help those around her. Indeed,
arguably any greater success in her portrayal in one film is

bound to correlate with some lesser success in her different
portrayal in the other film, given the divergent interpretations
given to the two characters by each director.
Thus, the distinctness of the two films is a simple matter of
logic: the lead actor's portrayals could not both be convincing
and unconvincing unless they were portrayals of distinct
characters in films that are themselves distinct because of
(among other things) the differing underlying intentions of the
two directors with respect to those two characters.[12]
In addition, there is another significant, though perhaps more
technical, argument for why the two films must be qualitatively
distinct. It is generally agreed that the title of an artwork can
play an integral part in characterizing the aesthetic qualities of
any artwork--and so much so, that even two otherwise
identical artworks must be distinct if they have been assigned
different titles by different artists having distinct artistic
intentions, as Jerrold Levinson has convincingly argued in the
case of musical works.[13] But in the present case, the two
films in question--Leslie's film Greed and Steve's film Sacrifice-do indeed have distinct titles assigned by different artists with
distinct intentions,[14] and hence must be aesthetically distinct
works.
Indeed, arguably this point alone is sufficient to refute any
attempts to explain away the current two-film case as really a
case of a single, jointly directed film. Thus my further
argument below could be regarded as being not strictly
necessary to further secure their distinctness, but instead
merely as showing how it is possible for the directors to
individually realize their own directorial intentions in thus
producing their own distinct films.
5. The 'frustration of intentions' argument
Here is a specific genuineness objection, which could be called
the 'frustration of intentions' argument, which proceeds as
follows. At every stage in the production of the two films, the
artistic intentions of each film director are being continually
frustrated by the activities of the other. Since each has veto
power over the other's artistic decisions, neither can be said to
be acting in a genuinely artistically independent manner.
This is so (the argument proceeds) because in the given
situation neither can unconditionally realize his or her
intentions, but instead can only realize them conditional upon
the approval or acceptance of the other. Hence their
supposedly independent artistic intentions are a sham, because
in practice their intentions are not independent at all. The two
directors can (according to this line of argument) succeed only
in jointly producing a single film which is the outcome of the
lowest common denominator of the intentions of each, namely
that set of intentions which each can minimally agree to, but
which set contains no distinctive intentions from either (upon
which the directors would disagree) of a kind such as would be
needed to establish the directorial independence of either of
them for the supposed films in question.
In reply to this skeptical argument, note first that a main part
of the force it may seem to have comes from assuming the
very point at issue concerning the example. This point is that it
is possible to have a final single length of film which in some
way embodies or results from two distinct sets of directorial
intentions which serve to distinguish two separate films.
However, the sceptical argument seems to assume that any
evidence that the directors have agreed upon the inclusion of a

given length of film in their joint projects (whether it is the
final print, or the result of some intermediate film-making
stage) is ipso facto evidence that they have must have agreed
on a common set of directorial intentions with respect to that
length of film. But the whole point of the example is to
demonstrate that this need not be so.
As a specific aspect of why this need not be so, note that we
must distinguish between a specific intention, and the choice of
a specific cinematic way in which to express that intention
(which could be called the 'mode of expression' of the
intention.) Though it is true that each director has the power to
veto the other's choice of a mode of expression for an
intention, it does not follow that thereby he or she has vetoed
the intention itself, for there may be at least one other mode of
expression of that intention which is not in fact vetoed by the
other director during the making of the films (who, recall, is
concurrently pursuing his/her own modes of expression of her
intentions.)
Second, note that even if a given intention of a director is
completely frustrated (in that no amount of reshootings etc.
result in the intention being expressed in any possible mode of
its expression,) it does not follow that all of the the intentions
of a given director will be thus frustrated. It is true that in
practice each director may be able (purposely or inadvertently)
to completely shut out any expression of a given intention by
the other, but there may still be a coherent set of film-making
intentions for each director, each of which sets is distinctively
different in various ways, yet the members of which are not in
fact shut out by the activities of the other director. But this
situation is all that is needed to underwrite the directorial
independence of the film-makers and the legitimacy and
genuineness of the example itself.
Another way to express this present point is as follows. If a
given initial set of directorial intentions by director A is taken
as providing necessary conditions for the identity of director A's
film X, then it is true that director B might prevent A from
making film X by her own activities in making her film M. But A
might still succeed in making a film Y during the same process
whose intention-set resembles that for film X in enough
significant ways for us to judge A's film-making efforts to been
artistically successful on substantially the same film project
during the joint film-making projects of A and B. And a similar
point of course applies to B's film-making efforts on her own
film during the same period. Thus I conclude that the current
objection has been disarmed.
6. A non-type, representational explanation of films
In this section I shall briefly describe an alternative account of
the nature of films, since without a plausible alternative a typetheoretic view of films is likely to persist, no matter how
convincing any attempted refutation, such as the present one,
may seem to be.
To begin, if a single length of film can embody or be the
vehicle for two or more distinct films, then clearly it cannot be
identical with either of them, since the two films are not
identical with each other, and there could be no good reason to
identify the strip of film with one of them in preference to the
other. Hence films cannot be concrete particulars such as strips
of film, or other physical entities or processes.
But what then is a film, if it is not a type? In several recent
papers[15] I have argued for an approach that provides a

broadly logical rather than an ontological answer to such
questions about the nature of artworks.[16] According to this
approach, the things that are usually considered to be artworks
(or to be tokens or instances thereof, as in type-theoretic
approaches), such as paintings, individual performances of
plays or music, copies of novels etc., are not themselves
artworks, but instead they are representations of artworks.
Thus on this view the film template that 'embodies' both
Leslie's and Steve's films in fact represents each of those films.
As to a film itself, on this view a film is whatever is represented
by representations of the film in question. (Such
representations would include both templates and individual
film performances or showings). This view is deliberately and
appropriately uninformative about the substantive nature and
ontological status of a film, since in general the ontological
status of various representations of any thing X tells us nothing
whatever about the ontological status of X itself. Nevertheless,
once that is understood, it is perhaps intuitively appropriate,
and harmless, to say that on my view a film is the
representational content shared or represented by all
representations of the film in question.
Moreover, for present purposes this representational approach
does have one all-important virtue (in addition to solving or
avoiding problems that undermine a type theory), namely that
it can easily explain how a single length of film (the single
physical outcome of Leslie's and Steve's film-making) can both
'embody' or represent Leslie's film Greed and Steve's film
Sacrifice. For in general it is unproblematic that a single
representational object may represent two quite different
things, such as in the case of a 'duck-rabbit' picture, which
represents, or can be seen as, either a duck or a rabbit.[17]
And what is more, the availability and general feasibility of this
representational view of artworks provides further evidence
that a case such as the current 'double film' case is indeed
legitimate (rather than logically deviant), and in general that
such cases are to be expected in various art forms if the
representational approach to the nature of art is correct.[18]
7. Interpretations of films
So far this article has been narrowly focused on logical and
ontological issues about film. But it would not be complete
without some brief discussion of broader issues concerning our
actual experience and appreciation of films. In particular, what
aesthetic difference should it make to the viewing of films in
general--which are not ambiguous in the way discussed here-if the current representational view, rather than the type view,
is correct?
This is a large topic, so one central issue only will be discussed
here, concerning various kinds of interpretation of films. My
argument will be that a type-based view of artworks would
make genuine interpretation of films impossible, but that there
are no corresponding problems for a representational view.
As a preliminary, it will be helpful to distill the conflict between
the type and representation views down to its simplest
elements. Consider again an ambiguous drawing, such as a
duck-rabbit drawing that can be seen either as a duck, or as a
rabbit.[19]
Now no such drawing could actually be an instance or token
both of a duck and a rabbit, because ducks and rabbits are
different types of animal, and hence can't share a common
instance or token. But of course a single drawing can represent

both a duck and a rabbit, even though it cannot be both a duck
and a rabbit. My more extended example of two films being
associated with a single length of film is an elaboration of this
basic difference between the type and representation views:
the length of film cannot be an instance of two different films,
but it can represent two different films.
To continue, the issue of interpretation arises as follows. It is
generally agreed that the concept of interpretation of
something as an X can only be applied if the object is not
actually or literally an X; for example, one cannot interpret or
see a duck as a duck, simply because it literally is a duck. Thus
in the case of a duck-rabbit drawing, it is only possible to
interpret the drawing as a duck (or as a rabbit) because the
drawing is not itself an instance or token of that animal.[20]
But similarly, I would argue, it is only possible to interpret
what one views on a screen as a particular film if the viewed
object or state is not itself an instance or token of that film.
The problem is that the type-token or instantiation relation for
a type X results in a physical object or state that concretely is
an X, and hence which cannot be interpreted as an X. Thus the
type view leaves no room for interpretation--whether aesthetic,
or of other kinds--in that it reduces the aesthetic enjoyment of
a unique filmic experience to the prosaic facticity of what kind
of object or state it is that one is viewing on the screen. Or,
otherwise put, it commits a Whiteheadean fallacy of misplaced
concreteness[21] in that it confuses what are in fact affective,
perceptual, conceptual and representational matters--the core
of interpretive issues--with concrete physical states that are
too determinate to be interpreted.
This interpretive criticism of the type view can be sharpened as
follows. There are at least two distinctive kinds of
interpretation involved in the viewing of a film--identifying
versus critical interpretation--neither of which can be explained
by a type view.
The first kind--identificatory or identifying interpretation--is
logically prior to ordinary critical interpretation. For example, if
one identifies a duck-rabbit drawing as being a drawing of a
duck, one has identifyingly interpreted the drawing,
subsequently to which one can proceed to critically interpret
the aesthetic qualities of the thus-identified duck. Or in the
main case of the ambiguous length of film, one could
identifyingly interpret what one sees on the screen either as
Leslie's film Greed or Steve's film Sacrifice--and having done
so, one could then go on to critically or aesthetically interpret
the relevant film as thus identified.
As for more usual films or pictures with which only one artwork
is normally associated, these cases arguably require a prior
identifying interpretation as well, in that there are various ways
in which a picture or film can be viewed, such as merely still or
moving shapes on a surface, or as a deadpan documentary,
that would not involve an identifying interpretation of what is
seen as specifically being a given visual artwork having
aesthetic qualities. Thus an identifying interpretation is a
necessary preliminary to any critical interpretation of a film as
such.[22]
However, on a type view, no such identifying interpretation is
possible, in that on its view, what one is looking at simply is an
instance of the film, leaving no room for any such further
interpretation of what is seen. While at the same time, no
critical interpretation is possible either, because on the type
view the relevant aesthetic properties of the film are concretely

instantiated on the viewed screen for all to see, so that the
type view has no theoretically principled way in which to
provide room for legitimate differing individual critical
interpretations of a film that go beyond mere correct versus
incorrect perceptions of it.
Thus, in sum, given the centrality of various concepts of
interpretation in discussions of artworks, the inability of a type
theory of film to accommodate such concepts is a serious
theoretical failing, quite apart from its logical flaws as
discussed earlier. It is therefore fortunate that an alternative
representational theory is available which is immune to these
particular problems, in that representational aspects of objects
or events are always open both to the possibility of diversity of
items represented, and to identifying interpretations of them
that pick out such items--along with subsequent critical
interpretations that assess their aesthetic worth.[23]
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